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Introduction 
“Democracy is flourishing.”  
– President George W. Bush commenting on Afghanistan,  
while welcoming President Karzai to the White House, May 23, 2005[1]  
Depending on the information source, the situation in Afghanistan is approaching unheralded 
success, or tragic failure.[2] Afghanistan today lies delicately suspended between the promise of 
stability and democracy, and a return to its chaotic and turbulent past, which unfortunately 
beckons like the call of the sirens. After decades of relentless fighting in this volatile state, recent 
years have witnessed watershed elections and significant rebuilding. While much is yet to be 
accomplished, significant progress has been made in human rights, political, and economic 
reform, not to mention improvements in infrastructures.  
These positive developments are countervailed, however, by a number of extremely disturbing 
trends: The actual influence and control of the new, democratically elected government of Hamid 
Karzai extends only weakly beyond the outskirts of Kabul; ethnic fragmentation seems to be on 
the rise; the country, especially in the east and the south, is racked by an increasingly threatening 
and sophisticated insurgency that appears to be adopting strategies and tactics used in Iraq; 
large areas of Afghanistan are still ruled by warlords/druglords; and, possibly most damning for 
the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, the country has become a narco-state with its opium 
crop and transport representing 60 percent of the country’s licit 2003 GDP.[3]  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the implications of the “post-conflict” political transition 
process used for creation of the Kabul regime for Afghanistan’s stabilization as well as good 
governance. In so doing, this paper will review and critique the Bonn Accords and Process—the 
major driver for Afghanistan’s post-conflict transition; assess the current situation in Afghanistan; 
and examine prospects for democratization, development, and stability. Specific focus will be 
placed on an analysis of the opportunities and obstacles facing Afghanistan’s government and 
societal transition to peace and stability, and building a nation from its shattered state of the last 
three decades. 
The Bonn Agreement and Process and Political Reconstruction  
Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions”—commonly 
referred to as the Bonn Agreement—has driven the Afghan political road map.[4] Once the defeat 
of the Taliban became imminent, the Bonn Conference was organized and on December 5, 2001, 
after nine taxing days of meetings and deal-making between various Afghan factions[5], the 
“Bonn Agreement” was signed.  
This UN-brokered deal was heavily influenced by the desires of the United States and established 
the provisional arrangements for Afghanistan to create permanent governmental institutions.[6] 
The Bonn Agreement’s goal was to lay the groundwork for Afghanistan’s future political 
processes and institutions of governance based on the commitment of “the right of the people of 
Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, 
democracy, pluralism, and social justice.”[7] Unfortunately, and most critical, the agreement was 
vague on how to explicitly achieve this goal;[8] rather, the Bonn Agreement created a government, 
not a state by only establishing timetables and benchmarks for future Afghan political processes.  
The Bonn Accord was also not a “peace agreement” to the decade-long Afghan civil war or 
conflict between the Taliban and the U.S.-led Northern Alliance, as Bonn only brought together 
the winners of the U.S.-led Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF), not the warring parties. 
Ironically many of the “winners” were Afghan factions that were historically opposed to each other; 
indeed many were direct opponents during the brutal civil war that began in earnest after the 
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in January 1989. As such the Bonn Agreement did not 
represent a conventional peace agreement and did not try to reconcile differences between the 
warring parties or attempt to draw members of the defeated group—the Taliban—into the process 
of government re-establishment or state creation. While Bonn did create the agenda and process 
for the establishment of permanent governance institutions, representing a new level of 
commitment and political will by both Afghans and major powers, it did not attempt to resolve 
many root problems, most notably, Afghan ethnic fragmentation and distrust that has plagued the 
country for decades, narcotics production, and regional “warlords.”  
As noted by some critics an additional potential problem arising from Bonn was that the 
agreement, in a very real sense, codified de facto power relations disregarding certain actors’ 
legitimacy or illegitimacy.[9] This was particularly pronounced in the allocation of key ministries to 
the Tajiks and Northern Alliance who at the time of the Bonn conference controlled Kabul in the 
aftermath of the Taliban’s demise. 
Figure 1 is a pictorial overview of the process spurred by this agreement. As suggested by this 
figure an explicit timeframe was established for the implementation of an interim, transition, and 
finally a fully representative and elective government. The Bonn Accords also established 
deadlines and procedures for constitutional development and explicit elections. In addition to 
creating a process and timetable for the establishment of permanent Afghan government 
institutions, the Bonn Accords also laid the groundwork for the following: the formation of loya 
jirgas—Emergency and Constitutional; national elections; the role of the United Nations in Afghan 
reconstruction; the reorganization of Afghan military forces; establishment of an International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the discharge of humanitarian and reconstruction aid. 
Figure 1: Bonn Process  
 For the full text of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, please click here.  
Below I will address and analyze the political dynamics and processes resulting from Bonn for re-
establishing the government. Specifically, I will assess the processes involved and the results 
with the loya jirgas, especially the interim and transition administrations and the national elections 
and their promise for a future stable and democratic Afghanistan. 
Interim and Transition Government Authorities[10]  
The Bonn Agreement called for establishment of an interim governing structure (Interim Authority) 
and established a timetable for a transition to a more “broad based gender-sensitive, multi- ethnic 
and fully representative”[11] government. The Interim Authority was to rule for six months until a 
traditional loya jirga could be convened to elect a Transition Authority or Government (see Figure 
1 for timeline). Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai was chosen to serve as head of an interim 
power-sharing council, which took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001. Most of the remaining 
administrators/ministers were selected from the representatives participating at the Bonn 
Meetings. 
The United States would most likely not have settled for any Afghan interim leader other than 
Karzai. After the Taliban's assassination of Abdul Haq in October 25, 2001[12], Karzai was the 
one creditable Pashtun leader who the United States knew well and, more importantly, trusted. 
Karzai a Durrani-Polpolzai Pashtun, was the son of a senator in the government of former King 
Zahir Shah, who was assassinated in Quetta, Pakistan by suspected Taliban elements in 1999. 
After his father’s death, Karzai was named the clan chief of the Polpolzai Durrani Pashtuns, which 
positioned him for a high-level leadership role in post-Taliban Afghanistan as the United States 
lobbied vigorously in Bonn to secure Karzai his position as the leader of the Afghan interim 
government.[13] The United States’ unbridled support of Karzai was to become a major theme of 
post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
One outcome of Bonn that would later have significant repercussions to Afghan political dynamics 
was the composition of Karzai’s Interim Administration (Cabinet of Ministers) that was “entrusted 
with the day-to-day conduct of state.”[14] The three most powerful ministries of this cabinet went 
to Panjshiri Tajiks of the Northern Alliance—which controlled the militia that had secured Kabul 
since the Taliban’s defeat. Younis Qanooni, who led the Northern Alliance's Bonn delegation, was 
selected Interior Minister. General Mohammad Fahim, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern 
Alliance, received the Defense Ministry, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah was selected as Foreign 
Secretary. The 30-member interim cabinet included 11 Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five from the Shi'a 
Hazara population, and three Uzbeks, with the rest drawn from other minorities. Table 1 presents 
the members of Afghan Interim Administration. 
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Tajik  Rural 
Development 
Minister  
Hanif Asmar  Pashtun  
        Supreme Court 




From a Tajik-dominated party. For a printable version of Table 1, please click here.  
The composition of this cabinet or group of administrators resulted in a variety of problems and 
helped to undermine the Karzai interim as well as transitional regime in many circles. Critics 
contended that neither Bonn nor the chosen government was very representative of the 
traditional power centers in Afghanistan. In particular, relatively few Pashtuns were given 
administrative/cabinet positions. Pashtuns expected this imbalance to be corrected in the 
Emergency Loya Jirga (which was to select the Transitional Administration) with Karzai shifting 
the balance of power back to Pashtuns and giving the former king a prominent national role. The 
Bonn Agreement called on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional 
administration, “to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be 
elected,”[15] no later than two years from the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. The 
Emergency Loya Jirga was also to elect a Head of State for the transitional administration.  
In addition to the selection of Harmid Karzai as Transitional President (a surprise to no one), the 
main issues concerning government composition of the Emergency Loya Jirga (of June 2002) 
turned out to be the role of the former king—Zahir Shah—and his representatives as well as the 
role of the Panjshiris. Once the former king gave his support for the election of fellow Pashtun 
Karzai as the Afghan head of state, ethnic issues were temporally diffused as subjects such as 
religion, the role of parliament, stability, and economic development dominated the jirga debates. 
This diffusion of ethnic suspicions and rivalry, however, proved short-lived.  
As suggested by Table 1, Karzai increased Pashtun representation in his new Transition 
Administration. Pashtun membership increased from the 11 members in the Interim 
Administration to 16 members while the remaining ethnic groups stayed fairly constant relative to 
their total representation in the Transition Administration.[16] This increase in Pashtun 
representation was most certainly an attempt by Karzai to shore up support with his Pashtun 
brethren as well as to respond to earlier criticisms from people such as Lakhdar Brahimi, the 
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General, who suggested that the Emergency Loya 
Jirga should be used to correct the imbalances of the cabinet resulting from Bonn to more closely 
reflect the Afghan demographics. Nonetheless, many of the most important and powerful 
ministries stayed in the hands of the Tajiks (Shura-e Nezar) who were still in control of the 
security apparatus dominating Kabul.  
The most problematic and sensitive appointments made by Karzai after his selection as 
Transition President were in the area of security. As suggested in Table 1, Karzai renamed 
Mohammed Fahim, leader of the Northern Alliance forces based in the Panjshir Valley, as 
defense minister. He also appointed Fahim as one of three vice-presidents, strengthening 
Fahim’s position in the Transition Government.[17] This move was a clear indication of the power 
of the Tajiks as well as the Northern Alliance and signaled Karzai's acceptance of the Panjshiris 
as necessary partners in his militarily weak government. Karzai apparently recognized that he 
could not keep stability without the help of powerful factional leaders such as Fahim.  
For all practical purposes there was only one key change in the cabinet resulting from the 
Emergency Loya Jirga—the departure of interior minister Yunus Qanooni. Qanooni, a senior 
Jamiat-e Islami figure, who represented Northern Alliance interests at Bonn, played a key role at 
Bonn in initially securing support for Karzai's candidacy among leaders of the powerful, Tajik-led 
political and military coalition. But in the months leading up to the Emergency Loya Jirga the 
relationship between Karzai and Qanooni became contentious reflecting much of the traditional 
distrust between Afghan Pashtuns and Tajiks.  
Karzai’s dismissal of Qanooni was met with considerable controversy. After the announcement of 
the appointment of Taj Mohammed Wardak, an elderly governor and ethnic Pushtun, as the new 
Interior minister, Panjshiri soldiers and policemen in the ministry initially resisted the change with 
roadblocks and work stoppages. Karzai, recognizing the implications of alienating the Tajiks as 
well as the reality of the considerable military strength of the Northern Alliance and especially the 
Panjshiris, eventually resolved the “crisis” by appointing Qanooni as adviser for internal security, 
a newly created post, as well as minister of education.[18] 
At the time of the Emergency Loya Jirga, Fahim, Qanooni, and Ahmad Zia Massoud[19] were all 
vying for the leadership of the Panjshiris (Shura-e Nezar), and relations among them became 
reportedly strained. The demands by Pashtuns that Panjshiri power should be reduced 
exacerbated relations in particular between Fahim and Qanooni. Indeed Qanooni eventually 
organized the Afghan opposition party and anti-Karzai alliance—Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin 
(New Afghanistan Party), while Massoud (in association with Fahim) formed Hezb-e Nohzat-e 
Melli-ye Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Movement Party). Karzai seemed to be caught in the 
middle of this politicking amongst the Panjshiri clique.  
Assessment of the Loya Jirgas to Post-Conflict Stability: Afghanistan’s 
Ethnic Dimension 
Questions of ethnicity are critical in assessing the implications of the loya jirgas to future Afghan 
political and social stability. Past attempts at modern state formation in Afghanistan that have 
directly challenged the local tribal and religious structures of society have resulted in ethnic 
backlash and state failure. Most recently, it has been argued by some that political factions from 
the former mujahideen parties, especially the Tajik Shura-e Nezar faction manipulated the loya 
jirga process as well as the Transitional Administration and that “President Hamid Karzai failed to 
grasp the opportunity to establish new constituencies and develop support for the peace-building 
process. Instead, Afghans have been frustrated by opaque procedures that increase the power of 
the factions in control of the central government and undermine attempts to create a new public 
culture of accountability.”[20] 
Afghanistan is a country with a diverse ethnic composition that complicates democratic, as well 
as, state formation. The present boundaries of Afghanistan were created to serve as a buffer 
between British and Russian Empires as Afghanistan confronted modernity through its forced 
integration into a Eurocentric state.[21] These “virtual” borders were not drawn along ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious lines and created an externally imposed “state” comprised of a complicated 
mix of people mostly living in small, kin-based communities outside of the limited urban areas. 
The underlying issue for Afghanistan’s governments has been their inability to create a sense of 
genuine national unity in times other than during crisis.[22] The lack of nationalism compared to 
the deep-rooted ethnic identity of the majority of Afghans reflects the realties confronting 
ethnically fragmented societies attempting to coalesce into one unified front.  
Today, Afghanistan is made up primarily of: Pashtuns who would like to see a strong and 
Pashtun-run central state; Tajiks who focus on power sharing in the central state; and Uzbeks 
and Hazaras who desire recognition of their identities and mechanisms of local government.[23] 
Although some of these groups are ethnically and linguistically distinct, they are not necessarily 
different in terms of culture.  
Historically, Afghanistan[24] has been ruled and governed by the Pashtun tribes of the south as 
they form the largest demographic bloc within Afghanistan. Unlike other ethnic groups, the 
Pashtuns stress pronounced tribal structures and codes at expense of the state. The Pashtun 
dominance of government has created an atmosphere of tension between them and the 
remaining ethnic groups in Afghanistan, mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. These tensions 
have lead to conflict as well as the introduction of repressive measures to quell the power 
struggle of these ethnic minority groups.  
These remaining ethnic groups have played certain specific roles within the society as a whole as 
well as within the government. However, not until the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan did 
these other ethnic groups truly gain power within the overall societal structure and establish 
themselves as a political and military force that the Pashtuns could no longer ignore. In the past, 
fighting for control of the state had occurred primarily between Pashtuns (i.e., Durranis vs. 
Ghilzais), but as these other ethnic groups rose in importance and made stabs at governing, 
there became a great struggle within Afghanistan that eventually led to outright civil war and the 
collapse of the Afghan Government and state structure.  
Since the beginning of modern Afghanistan, Afghan rulers have attempted to manipulate ethnic 
groups in their attempts to control the state. For example, “to weaken the Barakzais, Ahmed Shah, 
the 'father' of modern Afghanistan appointed a separate khan for the Achakzais, making the clan 
into a separate tribe, a status that they retain today.”[25] Successful Afghan ruling authorities 
have been artful in underscoring and exploiting the differences of these groups to include the 
encouragement of conflict between them in order to maintain control.  
Further complicating the dynamics of Afghan society are the relationships between the tribes 
themselves and between the varying ethnic groups that compose the nation-state. Simply put, the 
relationships between tribes are generally marked by “competition and outright animosity.”[26] 
The failure of many past Afghan regimes has been their inability to bridge the gap between these 
competing groups and their willingness to play different groups against each other in order to 
consolidate their power.[27] 
Karzai's choice of cabinet members for the Transition Government represented a compromise 
between stability and change. Many Pashtuns expected that he would make major changes to 
the cabinet chosen during the Bonn Meeting by removing factional leaders and appointing a 
balanced and professional cabinet more in line with the desires of the Pashtun community. 
Ultimately, this proved to be an impossible task because the leaders of the Northern Alliance 
were less than accommodating to change that would diffuse the considerable power they 
received from the Bonn Meeting. The Transition Cabinet reflected Karzai's recognition of the 
importance of striking a balance between the Pashtuns and Tajiks. Karzai had become intimately 
aware after leading Afghanistan's interim government for the previous six months of the uneasy 
partnership with leaders from the Tajik-led Northern Alliance. He also recognized the extremely 
difficult task of assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups while 
meeting the country's desperate need for professional governance after years of ruinous conflict.  
While the Emergency Loya Jirga achieved legitimacy for Hamid Karzai's transitional 
government—an end-state consistent with the desires of the United States and other international 
actors, the composition of this cabinet like the original interim administration was met with 
controversy, especially amongst the Pashtuns. The continued power of the Tajiks reflected by the 
ministerial portfolios they held did not sit well the Pashtuns (especially from the south and east). 
The prominent role of Tajiks in the Karzai Government perpetuated the alienation of much of 
Karzai's critical Pashtun power base. While former King Zahir Shah was named by Karzai as 
“Father of the Nation,” many Pashtuns were dismayed and angered that none of the King’s aides 
had been given senior posts.[28] It was viewed by these critical Pashtuns that other than Karzai 
very few Pashtuns held positions of power in the Afghan cabinet. In July 2002, a Washington 
Post article titled “Pashtuns Losing Faith in Karzai” posited that the Pashtuns were “becoming 
rapidly disillusioned by a series of developments that have reinforced the power of rival ethnic 
Tajiks and militia leaders, left the former king politically sidelined and a Pashtun vice president 
assassinated, and subjected Pashtun villages to lethal U.S. air attacks.”[29] 
While the ethnic tensions would eventually be played out in the Afghan national elections of 2004 
and 2005 (see below), the frustrations of many Pashtuns concerning Karzai was becoming 
explicitly evident. Padsha Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun warlord who reportedly controlled the 
three southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika in Spring/Summer 2002 summed up 
the sentiments of many Pashtuns when he asked, “Why are they humiliating Pashtuns? We're the 
majority. They placed Hamid Karzai at the top as a representative of Pashtuns. But in reality he's 
no longer a Pashtun. He's sold himself out. He's a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit around waiting. 
They will react and will claim their rights.”[30] 
Afghan Constitution  
In addition to the two loya jirgas discussed above that selected the Afghan interim and transitional 
administrations, the Bonn Agreement also called for a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) to adopt a 
new Afghan constitution within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority. The 
product of this loya jirga process must be considered as a critical foundation for the nation-
building process as well as long-term Afghan democratic stability. Special Representative of the 
Secretary General for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi acknowledged at a January 31, 2003 open 
meeting of the UN Security Council that the “drafting and ratification of the new constitution…will 
also be a fundamental state building exercise.” He also stressed the need to “broaden the political 
base supporting the peace process” because “too many Afghans feel excluded from the 
government and political transformation which Afghanistan is undergoing.”[ 31] 
The constitution was developed through three constitution-making organs—the Drafting 
Commission, the Constitutional Review Commission and the Constitutional Loya Jirga with the 
assistance of the United Nations (especially United Nations Assistance Mission, UNAMA, and 
UNDP).[32] During October 2002 Karzai created a nine-member Constitutional Drafting 
Commission that had the responsibility of producing a preliminary draft of the constitution. As 
would be experienced throughout the constitutional process, the Transitional Administration failed 
to establish this commission within the time period established by the Bonn Agreement. While 
Bonn called for the commission to be established “within two months”[33] of the Transitional 
Administration’s inception by August 2002, it was not created until October 5, 2002—four months 
after the Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 that established the Transitional Administration. 
Moreover, it was not until November 7, 2002 that former King Zahir Shah inaugurated this drafting 
commission. Hence, of the eighteen months originally envisaged in the Bonn Agreement for a 
constitution-making exercise, only thirteen remained when this commission began work.[34] This 
was problematic because even the full eighteen months is a limited amount of time to educate the 
Afghan people, largely illiterate, and query them on subjects as complicated and foreign as many 
of those contained in the constitution.  
In April 2003 the draft constitution was presented to the Constitutional Review Commission, a 35 
member commission, appointed by the president. As was the case with the drafting commission, 
this review body was “marked by considerable delay and involved primarily factional bargaining at 
the cabinet level without significant consideration of the public interest.”[35] This commission was 
mandated to “consult widely” with the people of Afghanistan and produce a draft constitution by 
August 30, 2003 for submission to the Constitutional Loya Jirga in October 2003. The delays in its 
formation, originally planned for February 2003 according to UNAMA officials, compromised “the 
possibility of real public debate, or even public education, about constitutional issues.”[36] 
Moreover, as argued by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the actual members of the group 
were “dominated” by Shura-e Nezar, and were:  
“never likely to yield individuals who could be viewed as legitimate national figures capable of 
transcending narrow, sectarian interests. Indeed, the eventual list of 35 [members of the 
commission] reflects in particular the interests of Shura-e Nezar and other jihadi groups, including 
Abd al-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad-e Islami Afghanistan, a group with Salafist inclinations and 
financial links to Saudi Arabia. One Shura-e Nezar appointee is known for his attempts to 
suppress civil society independent of his party in Kabul. Because several experienced politicians 
from jihadi groups have been included but respected moderate leaders and members of 
democratic groups are conspicuously absent, it is likely that the commission will be dominated by 
the former.”[37]  
The draft constitution was eventually handed off to the 502-person Constitutional Loya Jirga 
(selected in UN-run caucuses) which actually deliberated on the constitution from December 13, 
2003 to January 4, 2004. This representative body, which by a presidential decree could have no 
participation of either militia commanders or governmental officials, was tasked to confer 
legitimacy on the constitution through its review and adoption. Guidelines for this jirga suggested 
that:  
“In line with traditions of Loya Jirgas, the CLJ will be a grand representative meeting made up of 
all sectors of Afghan society and will deliberate upon and adopt the new constitution. To ensure 
their active participation in the deliberations, delegates will participate in a weeklong orientation to 
inform them about the contents of the Draft Constitution and rules of procedures of the CLJ. The 
CLJ will provide a further opportunity to build consensus on vital national issues and on 
controversies which might arise during the public consultations after the publication of the Draft 
Constitution.”[38] 
The constitution[39] that was eventually adopted established a strong presidential system with the 
President serving as both Head of State as well as Head of Government. The President who 
must be elected by a majority of the popular vote (or win a runoff election between the two top 
candidates if no candidate received 50 percent of the popular vote in an initial presidential 
election) was eligible to serve two five-year terms.[40] A proposal sponsored by the Northern 
Alliance to establish a prime minister as a check on the presidency, was not included in the 
original draft seemingly because of Karzai supporters' concerns that a prime minister might 
emerge as a rival to the presidency. 
The constitution established a bicameral legislature and a Supreme Court with High Courts and 
Appeals Courts, but no separate religious courts. The entire question of the Afghan judicial 
system is a matter of concern since many powerful Islamists presently are in or have influence in 
the emerging Afghan judiciary.  
The legislative body of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House or House of People) was established to 
promulgate laws, ratify treaties, and approve budgets. It also established that the Wolesi Jirga 
was to consist of 249 seats with members to be elected (concurrently, if possible, with the 
presidential election) by districts to 5-year terms. The Meshrano Jirga (Upper House or House of 
Elders) was to consist of a mixture of appointed and elected members (one-third of the seats 
were to be appointed by the president, one-third were to be selected by provincial councils, and 
one third were to be selected by district councils). This legislative body was given the authority to 
approve proposed laws and the budget. The constitution also gave the legislature the ability to 
impeach the president.  
The constitution established 34 provinces with each being governed by a provincial council 
whose members were to be popularly elected to four-year terms. Before this realignment 
Afghanistan had consisted of 32 provinces. Two new provinces—Panjshir and Diakondi—were 
added to the political map of Afghanistan.  
Map drawing in Afghanistan has always been a contentious issue and has ultimately related to 
issues of power alignment between Kabul and the hinterlands. For example, after the mujahideen 
captured Kabul and established their Tajik-dominated short-lived government, the number of 
districts in a number of northern provinces—especially in Badakhshan, the home province of 
then-President Burhanuddin Rabbani—was increased. The addition of Panjshir (Tajik dominated), 
established April 13, 2004 from Parvan Province, and Diakondi (Hazara dominated) from the 
northern section of Oruzgan Province, established March 28, 2004, were proposed by Karzai to 
further reflect his desire to have a multi-ethnic local government representation and attempt to 
right the long-held perceptions by minority ethnic groups’ perceived administrative injustices 
against the non-Pashtun regions.  
Article 22 of the constitution affirmed women's equality under Afghan law. In stark contrast to the 
years of Taliban rule during which Afghan women were subjected to well-documented, draconian 
social rules and abuses, the adopted Afghan constitution also gave particular emphasis to the 
role of women in the legislature. The constitution explicitly stipulated that for the Meshrano Jirga 
of those appointed by the president, 50 percent were to be women, meaning that one-sixth of 
upper house members were to be women. In the elected lower house at least 68 of those elected 
(two per each of the 34 provinces) by the constitution “should” be women.[41] That gave women 
about 25 percent of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga.  
Relative to political parties—institutions vital for a thriving democracy—the constitution was vague. 
The document allowed for political parties to be established so long as their charters “do not 
contradict the principles of Islam,” and do not have affiliations with foreign countries. The Political 
Parties Law that was later enacted by the Karzai Government provided the procedures for the 
legal registration of political parties in accordance with the constitution. This law prohibits political 
parties whose charters are “opposed to the principles of the holy religion Islam,” which is 
problematic since Islamic principles are open to interpretation. Furthermore, this dynamic affords 
influential Islamist groups an instrument to block parties they deem politically unacceptable.[42]  
While the constitution and the actual process employed for its ratification and adoption must be 
seen as positive steps for Afghanistan’s future the actual document and process surrounding it 
were not without flaws and have the potential to inhibit future stability.  
Afghan Elections  
According to the Bonn Accords, the Transition Authority was “to lead Afghanistan until such a 
time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be 
held no longer than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.”[43] 
Elections for the Afghan Presidency, National Assembly, and Provincial Councils were all to be 
held concurrently in the spring of 2004. That timetable for the elections was repeatedly changed. 
A series of events including electoral infrastructure delays, accelerating instability, and the 
apparent reemergence of the Taliban eventually led to the postponement and separation of the 
elections for Afghanistan's President, National Assembly, and Provincial Councils. The 
presidential elections were rescheduled from June 2004 to September 2004, then to October 
2004. Finally, a decision was taken to hold only presidential while the National Assembly and 
Provincial Council elections were eventually schedule for September 2005.  
On May 25, 2004, Karzai signed a law that was to govern the elections.[44] This law made the 
following provisions: 
· The populace would vote for individual candidates rather than political parties in the 
parliamentary elections.  
· Government officials who sought office as candidates, except the president, were 
required to resign from their government position at least 75 days before the elections.  
· To be eligible to run, presidential candidates were required to produce at least 10,000 
copies of eligible voter registration cards as evidence of voters’ support.  
The months leading up to the elections, originally planned for June 2004, saw a significant rise in 
violence throughout the country, especially directed towards election workers.[45] While some of 
this violence could be attributed to the reemergence of Taliban remnants, there was also a 
significant acceleration of the insurgency (especially in the east and west of the country) against 
the Karzai regime and American Forces. Voter registration soared in the anticipation of “free and 
fair” elections with most eligible voters registering even under the cloud of Taliban threats to kill 
registrants.[46] While 9 million of the eligible 9.8 eligible voters registered, the registration 
process saw blatant irregularities. “In the provinces of Khost, Nooristan, Paktia, and Paktika, 
voter-registration rates exceeded eligible voters by 140 percent. In 13 of the 34 Afghan provinces 
voter registration exceeded the number of eligible voters.”[47] All of these provinces lie along the 
Afghan-Pakistan border where Taliban and insurgent attacks have been frequent. Six other 
predominantly Pashtun provinces (Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar, Ghazni, Helmand and Kandahar) 
were also reportedly over-registered, compared to only three predominantly non-Pashtun 
provinces—Balkh, Badghis and Herat. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) refused to send election monitors to Afghanistan, because they believed that “the 
present conditions in Afghanistan [were] significantly below the minimum regarded by OSCE... as 
necessary for credible election observation.”[48]  
Considerable politicking reminiscent of the best western political machines took place in the 
months before the election, partly indicative of the number of candidates on the ballot. In 
December 2003, Karzai with the encouragement of the United States tried to undercut support for 
the Taliban by inviting “moderate supporters” of the Taliban, who also happened to be mostly 
ethnic Pashtuns, to join the political process in an exchange for their agreement to cease fighting 
the government.[49] Tajik leaders who thought that Karzai’s appeal to the Taliban was another 
indication of Karzai’s desire to primarily promote his fellow Pashtuns within his government 
viewed this moved with suspicion. It was even reported that Defense Minister Fahim and former 
President Rabbani, two prominent Tajik leaders, and other Northern Alliance figures sought to 
trade support for Karzai for a role in a coalition cabinet after the elections.[50]  
Karzai received de facto endorsement by the U.S. and European governments and Karzai took 
advantage of U.S. assets during his campaigning. It was also alleged that much of Karzai’s 
campaign financing came directly from foreign countries in direct violation of Afghan election 
laws.[51] Concerning foreign support for Karzai, it was suggested that:  
Karzai was also the only candidate who enjoyed access to U.S. military aircraft for campaign 
travel as well as round-the-clock protection by a private U.S. security firm. The AREU report also 
found ambient suspicion that the U.S. had allocated $30 million for the registration of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan, who are primarily Pashtun, to enhance Karzai's chances for reelection. The 
appearance of favoritism in the ethnically charged climate of Afghan politics makes it seem that 
the goal of the campaign is to elect a president at any cost, especially in the eyes of the often 
ignored and abused non-Pashtun "minorities."[52]  
Karzai also took long-expected (and long-threatened) action to marginalize warlords such as 
Ismail Khan, Rashid Dostum, Ustad Atta Mohammad, and Gen Daud. On September 2004 Karzai 
removed Ismail Khan as governor of Herat Province.[53] Weakening the power of regional 
leaders such as Khan and Dostum and expanding Karzai’s influence beyond the city limits of 
Kabul were goals long sought by the United States.  
A particular bold move by Karzai on July 26, 2004 was the dismissal of Mohammad Fahim, the 
powerful Tajik Minister of Defense and leader of the Northern Alliance, as one of his vice 
presidents. It is very interesting to note that July 26 was the last official date for the filling of 
presidential election candidacy forms by the official rules adopted by Afghanistan’s Joint Electoral 
Management Body.[54] It is reasonable to believe that Karzai waited to the very last moment 
before dumping Fahim because he probably expected that such a strategy would not allow for 
Tajiks to regroup and promote a new candidate. He guessed wrong. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that Karzai decided to replace Fahim because he viewed his position greatly 
strengthened by large voter registration. Many believe that his replacement of Fahim had a 
significant impact on shaking the support of one of Afghanistan’s most influential constituencies—
mujahideen commanders who led the resistance to the 1979-89 Soviet occupation.[55]  
Karzai replaced Fahim with Ahmad Zia Masood, brother of legendary Afghan resistance leader 
Ahmad Shah Masood as one of his vice presidential running mat es. On the very same day Yunus 
Qanooni[56], like Fahim, a Tajik and leader of the Northern Alliance as well as Karzai’s Minister of 
Education, announced his intention to run against Karzai. Up until this point, Qanooni, at least 
publicly, had been a supporter of Karzai’s candidacy. It seems reasonable to assume that a major 
motivating force for Qanooni’s candidacy was Qanooni’s desire to retain and preserve Tajik and 
Northern Alliance influence. Qanooni suggested that that Karzai’s dismissal of Fahim 
exacerbated “inter-ethnic tension” and stated that, “Ethnicity is again becoming a prominent factor 
in Afghan politics…this is not good for stability.”[57] On July 27, Karzai placed Kabul on a high 
security alert probably because of rumors in the capital that armed forces loyal to Fahim might 
stage an uprising. In addition to being Afghanistan’s defense minister, Fahim commanded the 
Afghan army's 8th Division, with an estimated 5,000 loyal troops stationed in the Shomali Plain—
the fertile land just north of Kabul—and in the capital itself. Fortunately no extra-legal actions 
were taken by Fahim and his militia. 
Qanooni’s candidacy soon garnered the support of Fahim, Foreign Minister Abdullah, all core 
leaders of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. It looked like the election was going to revert to 
a question of renewed inter-ethnic strife. 
Afghan Presidential Elections [58]  
On October 9, 2004 the presidential election took place with 18 eligible candidates on the Afghan 
presidential ballot. Approximately 8 million voters participated and, as expected, Harmid Karzai 
was elected with 55.4 percent of the vote, three times more votes than any other candidate. 
Karzai’s main opponents Yunus Qanooni, Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq, and Abdul Rashid Dostum 
received respectively 16.3 percent, 11.7 percent, and 10 percent. Twelve candidates received 
less that 1 percent of the vote. The lone female candidate Masooda Jalal, finished sixth with 
91,000 votes or 1.1 percent. While there were complaints about voter intimidation (especially in 
the Pashtun south and east), voting procedures, and allegations of multiple voting and 
irregularities in counting in some areas, an Impartial Panel of Election Experts concluded that the 
outcome had not been affected.[59]  
Considering that Afghanistan has no extended tradition of universal franchise, and has 
experienced almost a quarter century of continual conflict in its immediate past, the presidential 
election should be considered a watershed event. The critical question, however, became what 
do the results of the election represent?  
A statistical analysis of the election results suggests that the election clearly reified traditional 
ethnic splits in the country and traditional ethnicity remains at the forefront of Afghan politics.[60] 
Afghan ethnic groups tended to vote along ethnic lines rather than crossover to candidates from 
other ethnicities. While Karzai was elected with a majority of the vote, he was not elected with a 
majority of the vote from any ethnic group outside his own, the dominant Pashtun and his claim to 
represent a truly national candidate with support across ethnic lines is not borne out by this 
analysis. Qanooni, a leading figure in the Northern Alliance and himself a Tajik, received most of 
the Tajik vote; while veteran strongman Dostum garnered the votes of his fellow Uzbeks in the 
north; and Mohaqiq received the vote of the Shia Hazaras of central Afghanistan which he leads. 
Extremely troubling is that these findings do not bode well for a strong presidential system. 
Indeed it is reasonable to posit that a strong presidential system can be a recipe for disaster in 
countries such as Afghanistan where political elites are deeply-divided: a pure presidential 
system effectively permits only one winner, while potentially generating many disgruntled 
losers.[61] The Afghan governmental system mapped by the Bonn Agreement could fail 
miserably if Karzai were to take advantage of the opportunity of his strong office to further the 
causes of his own ethnic group—the Pashtuns. This would be disastrous for Afghanistan and 
would likely reinforce factionalism and deepen the rifts between ethnic groups, eventually 
resulting in civil war or secession. The challenge now facing the current Afghan government is the 
task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the mistakes of the past. The concept of 
national identity needs to be bolstered but not at the expense of marginalizing ethnic traditions 
and norms that are valued deeply by the Afghan people. Unifying a fragmented society and 
fostering the development of a national identity will be extremely difficult because each ethnic 
group is attempting to gain a foothold in government sometimes at the expense of other groups. 
Since this attempt at entering government is taken from an ethnic approach, rather than a 
regional or national one, the fragmentation of society will continue until either one dominant ethnic 
group controls all of the governmental power or ethnic politics will make way for increased 
internal conflict.[62] 
Afghan Legislative Elections  
Afghan legislative elections (including District elections) were initially planned per the 2001 Bonn 
Agreement to be held simultaneously with the Presidential Elections (originally in June 2004). 
However, due to a variety of factors including security concerns and the mere complexity of the 
legislative elections, these elections were postponed to a later date, similarly to what occurred 
during the constitution process.  
The elections that the United Nations judged the most complex in history were eventually 
rescheduled for September 18, 2005. Approximately 6,000 candidates[63] sought approximately 
390 parliamentary (Wolesi Jirga) and 217 provincial council positions.[64] Specifically 2,815 
candidates, including 347 women, sought Wolesi Jirga positions while 3,185 candidates, 
including 279 women, ran for provincial council positions.  
Legislative seats were to be directly elected by the voters. The exact number of representatives 
elected from each province was based on population data for the provinces provided to the Joint 
Electoral Management Board (JEMB) by the Central Statistics Office. The seat distribution was 
determined by the JEMB according to these population figures and calculated using the formula 
established in the 2005 Electoral Law. Each province was guaranteed a minimum of two seats. 
Hence, larger provinces such as Kabul, Herat, and Nangarhar received 33, 17, and 14 seats 
respectively in the Wolesi Jirga, while smaller provinces such as Nimrus, Nurestan, and Panjshir 
received the minimum of 2 seats. A similar, but more complicated, apportionment of seats was 
decided for provincial councils (see Table 3).[65]  
These elections were expected to be a mandate concerning the political direction taken since the 
ouster of the Taliban and the subsequent Bonn Agreement. The Karzai Administration since 
taking formal power had pushed vigorously for political reforms and governmental 
institutionalization; the continuation of Karzai’s agenda depended significantly on the 
government’s ability to engender support of a National Assembly. It was also believed that these 
elections would be a precursor for the establishment of political blocs that would eventually result 
in actual political parties, a seemingly critical component for a lasting Afghan democracy. Finally it 
was viewed that the voting patterns of these elections would “signal the extent to which influence 
[would] be based on common political ground—rather than strictly ethnic, religious, or provincial 
divisions.”[66]  
While the Afghan Presidential election suggested that Afghanistan remains a society deeply 
divided along multiple fault lines—ethnic, linguistic, and political—the planned Afghan legislative 
elections and the resulting composition of the National Assembly was viewed by Karzai as well as 
the international community as critical variables for the development of democratic governance in 
Afghanistan. 
Before addressing the results of these elections it is instructive to first assess the electoral 
process utilized for this critical Afghan political event. The structure and procedures used for 
these elections are important indicators of the more general political processes that have been 
employed since Bonn for the viability of a post-conflict Afghanistan.  
A major contention of these legislative elections involved the fact that political party participation 
was made negligent by the rules adopted for the elections. Candidates were not allowed to run 
under a party banner. Candidates could be independent, nominated, or endorsed by a political 
party, but political party symbols could not appear on the ballot. “The new Electoral Law—not 
released until May [2005], which excluded the use of party symbols on ballot papers, undermined 
nascent democratic groupings, while old jihadi networks continued to have access to power and 
resources.”[67] This election rule is a significant reason why there were near 6,000 candidates 
competing for legislative seats; the election rules played against political parties in favor of 
individuals. Moreover, this rule portended to favor candidates appealing to regional or ethnic 
biases rather than political ideologies and programs that would have most certainly accompanied 
an election that encouraged political party participation. Past experience shows that neglecting or 
inhibiting political party participation in elections can enhance extremist candidates and positions.  
Political parties, in one incarnation or another, have been responsible for much of the past 
violence in Afghanistan and, moreover, represent different contingent of a fragmented Afghan 
society. While many Afghans are indeed historically leery[68] of political parties because parties 
such as the Communist People’s Democratic Party (both Khalq and Parcham factions), the 
Taliban, and various mujahideen parties have helped wreak havoc on the country over the past 
three decades, the implications of a non-viable pluralistic party system, that should have revealed 
itself during the legislative elections, does not bode well for future Afghan political stability.  
As seen in Table 2—to view, please click here—there is no dearth of political parties in 
Afghanistan. At the time of the elections, numerous parties had formally registered with the 
government. Since the Bonn Agreement numerous small, democratic parties have been formed 
that seemed to represent a break from the past and appeared to be essential components for 
Afghanistan’s fledgling democratic ambitions. Nevertheless, “the government has built a hostile 
environment for political parties, including electoral laws and decrees that render such groupings 
all but obsolete.”[69]  
There were a variety of reasons for the Karzai Government’s antipathy towards political parties. 
Sources close to President Karzai have stated that despite his rhetoric to the contrary, he views 
political parties as a major cause of Afghanistan's past wars and instability.[70] Karzai has himself 
has refused to join or organize a party. Karzai running as an independent received a thin majority 
in the Presidential election and many believed that opposition candidates, representing various 
political parties, would coalesce to inhibit him receiving a majority of the vote.  
While there was little doubt that he would achieve a plurality of the vote there was considerable 
concern as to his ability to receive a majority of the vote because of the number of candidates 
and the expectation that many candidates (Qanooni, Dostum, and Mohaqiq) would secure a large 
number of votes in their ethnic regions. The mathematics were obvious—with 18 opponents, 
Karzai's chances of gathering less than 50 percent of the votes were very real and this would 
have been a set-back for both Karzai and the United States.[71] Of course he did receive a 
majority of the vote but the threat of candidates coalescing against him still reinforced his initial 
decision to not allow legislative candidates to run under a political party banner. Karzai’s decision 
to oppose a draft electoral law in 2004 that would have mandated a party list system was in 
defiance of advice from the United Nations and international advisers—with the exception of his 
most powerful backer, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.[72] “Some party activists and officials, 
however, believe Karzai's stance [towards political parties] can be attributed more to rising 
domestic dissatisfaction with his performance, particularly in his home base, Kandahar.”[73]  
In addition to the lack of any meaningful political party participation, a second contention of the 
process used in the legislative elections was that voters were forced to cast a single non-
transferable vote (SNTV). The SNTV rule meant that each Afghan voter cast a single vote even 
though there would be multiple members to serve their respective electoral district. It is clear that 
such a system as admitted by the government was an additional instrument used to marginalize 
the political parties. As suggested by the Afghan government the SNTV voting system was 
selected to:  
limit the potential influence of political parties. Voters may select single candidates from among 
those listed on the ballots under the SNTV system, with those receiving the most votes taking up 
seats designated for their constituencies. While parties may endorse candidates to both the lower 
house of the national legislature (People's Chamber) and to Provincial Councils across the 
country, those people will compete as individuals. Ballots will include candidates' names, titles, 
photographs, and their electoral symbols -- but not party endorsements. The role of political 
parties is widely expected to increase once the national, provincial, and local legislatures begin 
functioning as candidates form blocs based on party allegiance and other factors.[74]  
The decision to utilize the SNTV system of voting for the legislative elections was the subject of 
considerable criticism. Barnett Rubin writing in the International Herald Tribune suggested, “[t]his 
system in fact virtually guarantees the formation of an unrepresentative parliament of local 
leaders with no incentive to cooperate with one another or the government. It places a premium 
on vote-buying and intimidation, since swinging even a small number of votes can easily affect 
the outcome. Well-organized parties that can propose a limited number of candidates and 
discipline voters to spread their votes among them can win a disproportionate share of seats.”[75] 
Other experts argued that SNTV was particularly ill-suited for Afghanistan because the country 
lacks well-organized political parties. Such an electoral system requires parties to educate their 
supporters in each region as to how to apportion votes across candidates. In the absence of such 
education and voting strategies some candidates will receive too many votes and others too few. 
Thus a party could easily gain a very different number of parliamentary seats than its percentage 
of the vote might suggest it deserved.[76] But for those parties well-organized and having the 
ability to discipline their supporters such as large ethnic and regional parties—Hizb-e-Wahdat  and 
Junbish—this could result in disproportionate representation of a few large regional or ethnic 
parties or conversely result in a fragmented legislature. While the ultimate implications of this type 
of voting and the resulting legislative makeup will be more apparent over time, SNTV would most 
definitely prove to have a major impact on the actual election results. 
Afghan Legislative Elections Results 
After much delay and anticipation Afghan’s legislative elections were held on September 19, 2005. 
Table 3—to view, please click here—presents legislative voting data by Afghan province. As 
presented in this table, 57 percent of the Afghan population had registered and were eligible to 
vote in these elections. Three provinces had over 100 percent voter registration—Paktika (138 
percent), Panjshir (109 percent) and Nurestan (101 percent). These data probably suggest voter 
fraud relative to the primarily Pashtun province of Paktika which also had significant over-
registration in the presidential election registration and overwhelmingly voted for President Karzai 
(88.4 percent) and the Panjshir province which is the primarily Tajik and home base of the 
Karzai’s major opponent Qanooni. But the over-registration did not lead to additional votes in 
Panjshir. Only 35 percent of Panjshiri “registered” voters actually voted in the election. This would 
seem to suggest that the registration process in this Tajik province was of questionable integrity 
but the ultimate implications proved negligible. The over-registration in the mountainous and 
remote Afghan province of Nurestan probably reflected poor or inaccurate census data. Voting 
fraud was also alleged during the presidential elections but it is difficult to assess its implications 
for the ultimate election results. While not excusing fraud, one should expect that elections in 
countries such as Afghanistan—with its lack of historical experience in open and free elections 
and lack of mature electoral infrastructures and logistics—will result in less than totally 
transparent elections.  
More problematic than over-registration in a few provinces was the national election voter 
turnout—49.8 percent; substantially lower than the October 2004 presidential election. Turnout 
was highest in the Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tajik ethnic minority provinces in the north—generally 
over 60 percent—and lowest (below 30 percent) in some of the Pashtun-speaking south-eastern 
areas where the Taliban insurgency is strongest. This was especially evident in Oruzgan (23 
percent) and Kandahar (25 percent), two provinces that have been Taliban strongholds —the 
former being the home of Mullah Omar and the later being the spiritual capital of the Taliban (as 
well as the home base of President Karzai)[77]—where remnants of the Taliban pursued 
campaigns of intimidation against prospective voters. Turnout was also surprisingly low (34.5 
percent) in Kabul. The lack of turnout in Kabul is especially troubling considering that this urban 
populace is the most highly educated, and most politically sophisticated, in the country.  
The relative lack of voter turnout was probably due to the lack of identifiable party lists and the 
use of SNTV (discussed above). Both of these electoral rules created confusion in many voters 
as to who they were voting for. Moreover, the sheer number of candidates running under ballot 
banner icons such as c ups, beds, lions, rings, leafs, footballs, cars, etc. were extremely 
confusing (see the Appendix for an example of a portion of an official Kuchi Afghan legislative 
ballot). Candidates were not able to choose the icons themselves: instead, the electoral 
committee selected them. Such icons were reportedly used because of the sizable percentage of 
the Afghan population that is unable to read and write. Illiteracy and lack of voting experience 
also had other infl uences on the actual act of voting. The Economist, for example, suggested that 
the size of the ballot in some provinces required ballots of up to 40 pages. In some areas, voters 
were confused by the notion of “turning pages” of the ballot.[78]  
Election Day did not witness the degree of violence many analysts had expected and feared. No 
major attacks were directed at Afghan polling centers, but 12 people were killed by violence 
associated with the election, a very troubling statistic nevertheless.[79] On October 9, 2005 the 
first results of the elections were announced. Final results were delayed by accusations of fraud 
and were not declared until November 12, 2005.[80]  
The results of the election did uphold the notion that the procedures used in this election would 
favor localized candidates and strong regional figures and groups (see above). In the most 
general sense, the election for Afghanistan’s Parliament and provincial assemblies’ suggested a 
victory for Islamic conservatives and the mujahideen. Slightly less than half of the seats of Wolesi 
Jirga, or lower house of the Parliament, were captured by Islamist or conservative religious 
figures[81] and while these results do not mandate a clear anti-Karzai Parliamentary majority,[82] 
the results did not represent anything near an overwhelming or clear mandate for the Karzai 
Administration.  
The former mujahideen leaders elected, for the most part, had an electoral base limited to their 
own ethnic groups and regions where they exercise considerable influence and control. These 
commanders had been shut out of the Karzai Administration who favored more ex-pats and 
technocrats. The legislative elections provided the mujahideen an opportunity to reassert their 
influence through the electoral process. Many of those elected had struggled for years to repel 
the Soviets from their country and had been extremely disenchanted by the Karzai regime for its 
failure to embrace them in valuable administrative positions.  
While some pro-Karzai candidates such as his brother—Ahmad Wali Karzai—won Wolesi Jirga 
seats the election results represent a defeat for the Karzai Government. The election results 
suggested that the 249 member Wolesi Jirga will consist of five broad, possibly overlapping 
groups:  
1. First, former mujahideen, including approximately 40 members of Hizb-e Islami[83] who 
appear to have distanced themselves from their party leader and current antigovernment 
fugitive Gulbuddin Hekmatyar;  
2. Second, independents, technocrats and those tribal or regional leaders who are not 
presently affiliated with any of the established Afghan political parties;  
3. Third, 11 former communists and other leftists many of whom have and joined 
mujahideen parties or remnants of the Taliban; and  
4. Fourth, former members of the Taliban establishment.[84] Three prominent former 
Taliban of this last category were ex-commander Haji Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi, ex-
provincial governor Mawlavi Islamuddin Mohammadi, and a senior former security official, 
Hanif Shah Al-Hussein.  
5. The fifth group of the new parliament consists of former ministers and six deputy 
ministers of the government, many of whom had been dismissed by Karzai as he 
attempted to consolidate power over the previous three years. These ex -ministers 
included former interior and education minister and leader of Karzai’s opposition Younus 
Qanooni, former planning minister Mohammad Mohaqiq, another planning minister 
Ramzan Bashardost, former commerce minister Syed Mustafa Kazimi, ex-minister for 
water and energy Mohammad Shakir Kargar, border and tribal affairs minister Arif 
Noorzai, and former minister for transport Mohammad Ali Javid. The six former deputy 
ministers elected to the Wolesi Jirga included Najiba Sharif, Abdul Qadir Imami, Engineer 
Mohammad Asim, Hilaluddin Hilal, and Mirwais Yasini.  
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an ethnic Pashtun and a Karzai supporter who is an extreme Islamist and 
alleged war criminal as well as terrorist supporter, also won a parliament seat from Kabul with a 
bear minimum of votes (see below).  
Women won 68 seats, slightly more than the 25 percent representation guaranteed under the 
new electoral system. Females elected to parliament included: Malalai Joya, a vocal proponent of 
women’s rights who rose to prominence during a 2003 constitutional conference when she stood 
up and denounced mujahideen commanders as criminals who should be put on trial; Fauzia 
Gailani who was the surprisingly leading vote getter in conservative Herat; and Shukria Barekzai, 
editor of Woman Mirror magazine. 50 independents or educated professionals were also elected, 
many members of the groups discussed above. Five provincial council seats in the conservative 
south and east were left vacant because too few women candidates registered.  
Karzai’s prime presidential opponents and leader of their respective ethnic groups—Qanooni 
(Tajik), Mohaqiq (Hazara) and Dostum (Uzbek)—were the biggest vote getters in the Kabul and 
Jowzjan Provinces and appear to have enhanced their opposition positions. “Victories by leading 
Northern Alliance candidates, local militia figures from the past Communist and Taliban eras 
could confront Karzai with opposition that could slow government decision-making and cause him 
to proceed cautiously in his close relationship with U.S. officials in Afghanistan.”[85]  
Many unknown candidates were also elected. Indeed, because of SNTV and the prohibition of 
meaningful political party participation, many candidates won virtually by chance. For example, in 
Wardak Province where 69 candidates competed for 5 Wolesi Jirga seats, the leading vote getter 
(Abdul Reza Rezaee) received 10 percent of the vote. The other winners which included the two 
former Taliban members including the former planning minister (Haji Mosa Hotak) and a Hizb-e 
Islami candidate (Roshanka Wardak) received from 6.6 percent to 3.9 percent of the votes. 
Numerous other provinces experienced the same kind of results where candidates were elected 
by chance! In fact some winners received less than 1 percent of the vote in their respective 
provinces. In Badakshan Province where 87 candidates ran for 9 seats, Kubra Dehqan was 
elected yet she only received 0.8 percent of the vote. She received 1825 votes out of 243,740 
cast.  
Table 4 presents the Wolesi Jirga results for the important Kabul Province where 387 candidates 
sought 33 positions. This table clearly demonstrates many of the problems associated with the 
election. 
Table 4: Kabul Province Wolesi Jirga Results 




Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq  52,586  13.2%  
Mohammad Younus Qanooni  31,225  7.8%  
Bashar Dost  30,794  7.7%  
Haji Mohammad Arif Zarif  9,934  2.5%  
Ustad Abdrab Alrasoul Sayaf  9,806  2.5%  
Sayed Mustafa Kazimi  8,884  2.2%  
Engineer Abbas  4,645  1.2%  
Mullah Mohammad Mojahed  4,624  1.2%  
Haji Sayed Jan  3,992  1.0%  
Malalai Shinwari  3,869  1.0%  
Doctor Kabir Ranjbar  3,333  0.8%  
Haji Mohammad Baqir Shaikzada  3,200  0.8%  
Doctor Naematullah  3,165  0.8%  
Mir Ahmad Juyenda  3,105  0.8%  
Mohammad Ismael Safdari  3,083  0.8%  
Haji Mohammad Dawood Kalakani  2,900  0.7%  
Anwar Khan Auriakhel  2,885  0.7%  
Haji Najibullah Kabuli  2,867  0.7%  
Mohammad Senkin Tawakalzai  2,808  0.7%  
Jamil Karzai  2,602  0.7%  
Al-Haj Baidar Zazai  2,415  0.6%  
Alami Balkhi  2,324  0.6%  
Fatima Nazry  2,322  0.6%  
Shukra Barakzai  2,201  0.6%  
Mohammad Ibrahim Qasimi  2,171  0.5%  
Erfanullah Erfan  2,157  0.5%  
Sayed Dawood Hashemi  2,130  0.5%  
Shinkai Zahin Karukhel  2,107  0.5%  
Shahla Atta  2,040  0.5%  
Qudriya Ibrahim Yazdan Parast  1,960  0.5%  
Sabrina Saqeb  1,785  0.4%  
Fauzia Naseryaar Haidari  1,764  0.4%  
Najiiba Sharif  1,547  0.4%  
Source: Calculated from data presented by Joint Election Management Body (JEMB). For a 
printable version of Table 4, please click here.  
Kabul is the most populous province in the country with over a three million people. 1,193,472 
Kabulis registered to vote but only 399,810 valid votes were cast (35 percent) As presented in 
Table 4, Mohaqeq received the highest percentage of votes of any candidate in Kabul—13.2 
percent. Qanooni and Dost were the next two largest voting percentages, with 7.8 and 7.7 
percent, respectively. The other 30 winning candidates received from 2.5 to 0.4 percent of the 
vote. 
Having elected 30 of the 33 representatives to the parliament from the country’s capital 
individually receiving less than 3 percent of their constituents’ votes is amazing. 46 percent of the 
Kabuli electorate voted for losing candidates which would not be surprising if only two or three 
candidates where running; but for Kabul representation in the legislature there were 387 
candidates. The aggregate nation-wide votes collected by all Wolesi Jirga winners represented 
only 35.8 percent of the total vote.[86] Put another way, 64.2 percent of the Afghan voters 
supported losing candidates. A clear majority of Afghan voters supported losing candidates—a 
very troubling and unique dynamic for a democratic election! 
It is evident that the SNTV and the lack of political party participation helped to skew the 
elections’ results and produce a Wolsei Jirga that will be highly fragmented. If this legislative body 
becomes hopelessly stalemated and ineffectual the odds of groups pursing their own parochial 
interests by other means is greatly intensified. This is a dangerous possibility considering that 
Afghanistan, an ethnically, linguistically, religiously diverse and extremely complex country with 
no democratic tradition, has been in continual and violent conflict since the 1970s. Faith in the 
democratic process could quickly wane and encourage the many elements in the country that are 
already interested in pursuing power via extra-legal ways to act outside of the structures 
established by Bonn. A legislative impasse in the Wolsei Jirga could also push Karzai to 
personalize the Afghan government to an even greater extent and in the process alienate his 
opponents.  
What ever the future holds for the Afghan Legislature it seems that this body has had the odds 
stacked against it. The members of this legislative body were not elected with the support of the 
majority of Afghan citizens. Moreover, its members consist of a series of influential coalitions of 
former mujahideen and Taliban commanders, communists, tribal nationalists, royalists, warlords, 
and urban professionals that do not like one another. One recent source reporting on the opening 
of the Wolsei Jirga has suggested:  
There is already discord within [the parliament]. Two elected were candidates murdered before 
the parliament convened. With powers to sack ministers and block legislation, the parliament 
could make life difficult for Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president. How he will juggle its various 
groups is unclear. For four years, he has veered unpredictably between the mujahideen 
conservative and secular reformist cliques in his government. In the contest to be speaker of 
parliament, he gave discreet backing to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an extreme Islamist accused of 
revolting war crimes, but a fellow Pashtun. Seemingly, Mr. Karzai considered him the only 
candidate capable of defeating Yunus Qanooni, the self-styled leader of the opposition and a 
Tajik. If so, he was wrong. Mr. Sayyaf’s war record pushed a number of Pushtun members to 
back Mr. Qanooni, who defeated his rival and won the contest by five votes… A crucial test of 
parliament will come later this month when it will vote to approve Mr. Karzai’s cabinet. Heads are 
likely to roll, with the mujahideen keen to oust several western-educated, technocratic 
ministers.[87] 
It is difficult enough for a mature democracy, such as the United States, to deal with a contentious 
and fragmented legislature. The implications for Afghanistan are immense.  
Conclusion  
There is little doubt that substantial, indeed historical, achievements have taken place in 
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, and many of these achievements are directly attributable 
to the Bonn Process. Nevertheless, the Bonn Process has been tainted by a number of flaws and 
miscalculations that have impacted on the potential of Afghanistan becoming a democratic, 
peaceful, and secure country. Barnett Rubin in assessing the Bonn Agreement writes: 
It obliged the Afghan government to carry out a series of actions, all of which required 
international support for their success, but it did not impose any obligation on those whose 
assistance was essential. Bonn also was lacking in that it was not a peace agreement in the 
normal sense of the word—that is, an agreement negotiated among the parties to a conflict. The 
major party to the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban movement, was not represented. Bonn took 
place only because of 9/11 and because the U.S. government decided to react to Al Qaeda's 
threat by removing the Taliban regime from power militarily. If the United States had not done that, 
there would not have been any Bonn talks, there would not be any interim or transitional 
administration, and the Taliban would have remained in control of Afghanistan. These peculiar 
circumstances created some serious birth defects in the interim administration and its 
successor.[88] 
Bonn was not a peace agreement that resolved the grievances of the warring parties. The Taliban 
were not even party to the agreement. The Taliban remnants have regrouped and are presently 
engaged in an insurgency that is not only intensifying but also mimicking the tactics and 
strategies employed by the Iraqi insurgents as they target police, international aid workers, and 
troops. While the Taliban lay relatively dormant after their fall from power, 2005 has witnessed a 
significant increase in insurgent activities to include suicide bombings, roadside bombs (IEDs), 
kidnappings, and ambushes. 2005 has seen a significant rise in deaths attributed to the 
insurgency that the Afghan government and its international supporters have not been able to 
eliminate. In retrospect, Bonn should have at least attempted to draw into the political process 
moderate Taliban. Just wishing the movement to go away is not enough. While the likelihood of 
the Taliban seizing power is close to nil, they nevertheless continue to wreak havoc on the 
society through hit and run tactics and intimidation.  
The failure of Bonn to address the problem of regional warlords was also a monumental mistake. 
The interim and transitional governments created by Bonn became dependent on the power base 
of the warlords. The Afghan Government and the United States used the warlords and their 
respective militias to help stabilize Afghanistan after the fall on the Taliban and, in so doing, 
helped to entrench their power and status. Mohammed Fahim, for example, became Defense 
Minister and an extremely important power broker because the Tajiks of the Northern Alliance 
controlled Kabul after the fall of the Taliban, not because he was the right man for the defense 
ministry. His militia guaranteed him a powerful position in the initial Karzai administrations, 
nothing more. Other regional leaders such as Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan gained 
considerable power in a similar fashion. While Karzai eventually moved to co-opt these warlords, 
with considerable U.S. support, their power base remains intact. The problem of regional militias 
and the influence of warlords, many fueled by lucrative drug production and trade, is a colossal 
problem with no end in sight.  
The mujahideen, especially middle-level commanders who had shed their blood in repelling the 
Soviet invaders and who always believed that they should be franchised in Kabul, was one group 
that definitely lost out in and after Bonn. They were virtually ignored by the Karzai administration. 
The recent legislative elections have given the mujahideen new life.  
The Afghan Constitution is an extremely important accomplishment of the Bonn Process. But the 
lack of a full public debate before its ratification was a missed opportunity to have a wide ranging 
public debate on two divisive issues: the role of Islam and the specification of relations between 
the Kabul and the regions. Regarding the latter, the recent elections, as suggested above, have 
reinvigorated the mujahideen parties. Many of these parties, however, have a long history of 
animosity reflecting sharp differences. These divisions between the mujahideen and with the 
central government could deepen factional conflict if improperly handled. Islam, in contrast, could 
become an umbrella issue that would facilitate a coalition between disparate regional 
commanders who are discontented with the Karzai administration or searching for ways of 
expanding their territorial influence. Further, there is a long-term risk that the incorporation of 
Islam into the constitution will empower extremist groups, like Ittehad-e Islami Afghanistan and 
factions within Jamiat-e Islami, at the cost of weakening new democratic groups and undermining 
the foundations of civil liberties, particularly for women and the Shia minority.[89]  
The findings presented above concerning both the presidential and legislative elections are 
particularly troubling. Karzai’s election was a reification of long held ethnic biases and conflicts. 
He was not able to engender significant support beyond his Pashtun base and he has not proven 
to influence much beyond the city limits of Kabul. The legislative election results were even more 
disappointing. The election rules adopted ironically backfired on the Karzai administration. The 
election produced a legislature consisting of a strange mix of former mujahideen commanders, 
Taliban, long-defunct communists, royalists, warlords, and urban professionals. Moreover, the 
voting results suggested that the Wolesi Jirga does not have public legitimacy, being elected by a 
minority of the electorate. The fact that so many candidates could be elected to this important 
legislative body with less than 5 percent of their respective electorate’s support should bring 
pause to those that believe transparent democracy is “flourishing” in Afghanistan. These elections 
were tragically flawed and their results have the potential to derail Afghans' faith in democracy 
and the legislative process if this legislative body turns into a hollow shell.  
The Wolesi Jirga elections also reinforced the importance of political party participation for a 
democratic Afghanistan. Karzai’s fear of a multiparty system as explicitly stated by the 
government in their defense of not allowing their participation was extremely counterproductive. 
The numerous parties that have been formed since Bonn should be encouraged to participate in 
public debate. Relegating them to the sidelines of the body politic only increases their probability 
of attempting to pursue their agendas through other means. Narrowing legal channels for the 
articulation of ethnic, sectarian, or regional priorities and grievances could promote tensions and 
discord. Afghanistan is and will remain a fragmented society. But diversity of opinion need not 
manifest itself in conflict dynamics. Interchange and a viable Afghan multiparty system should be 
encouraged, not discouraged. 
Ultimately the success or failure of Bonn has more to do with Afghanistan itself than the process it 
employed. While Afghanistan is a legal “state” and a fledgling member of the international system, 
it is a “state” that has been in a condition of intensive and destructive conflict for nearly three 
decades. It is impossible to build a democratic state in the absence of a state; and the essential 
condition for a state is to have an effective monopoly over the means of violence.  
There is no escaping the fact that decades of continuous conflict has left Afghanistan without 
efficient, functioning governmental and political institutions and apparati, not to mention 
ineffective security services and a meager civil service. Heavy reliance on the international 
community and particularly the United States to fill the gap in both functional political processes 
and security services has left Afghanistan without an effective revenue base, and a dependence 
on international donor aid for reconstruction.  
Even if the Bonn Process had been entirely defect-free, its ultimate results would likely be in 
question because of the condition of the Afghan “state.” While Afghanistan’s future is being built 
on new democratic principles, one can only hope that underneath those principles, Afghanistan’s 
troubled and violent past is not beckoning irresistibly—like the call of the sirens. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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